Judgement utility modulates the use of explicit contextual priors and visual information during anticipation by Gredin, NV et al.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Psychology of Sport & Exercise
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/psychsport
Judgement utility modulates the use of explicit contextual priors and visual
information during anticipation
N. Viktor Gredina,⁎, David P. Broadbenta,b, A. Mark Williamsc, Daniel T. Bishopa,b
a Division of Sport, Health and Exercise Sciences, Department of Life Sciences, Brunel University London, United Kingdom
b Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, College of Health and Life Sciences, Brunel University London, United Kingdom
c Department of Health, Kinesiology, and Recreation, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, United States







A B S T R A C T
Objectives: We examined the impact of judgement utility on the use of explicit contextual priors and visual
information during action anticipation in soccer.
Design: We employed a repeated measures design, in which expert soccer players had to perform a video-based
anticipation task under various conditions.
Methods: The task required the players to predict the direction (left or right) of an oncoming opponent’s im-
minent actions. Performance and verbal reports of thoughts from players were compared across three conditions.
In two of the conditions, contextual priors pertaining to the opponent’s action tendencies (dribble= 70%;
pass= 30%) were explicitly provided. In one of these experimental conditions, players were told that an in-
correct ‘right’ response would result in conceding a goal, which created imbalanced judgement utility
(left= high utility; right= low utility). In the third control condition, no explicit contextual priors or additional
instructions were provided.
Results: The explicit provision of contextual priors changed players’ processing priorities, biased their antici-
patory judgements in accordance with the opponent’s action tendencies, and enhanced anticipation perfor-
mance. These effects were suppressed under conditions in which the explicit contextual priors were accompanied
by imbalanced judgement utility. Under these conditions, the players were more concerned about the con-
sequences of their judgements and were more inclined to opt for the direction with the higher utility.
Conclusions: It appears that judgement utility disrupts the integration of contextual priors and visual informa-
tion, which results in decreased impact of explicit contextual priors during action anticipation.
1. Introduction
In dynamic and rapidly evolving environments, fast and accurate
anticipation of an opponent’s actions underpins expert performance
(Williams, 2000). Researchers have tried to elucidate the processes by
which athletes combine prior knowledge and beliefs relevant to the
specific performance context (i.e., contextual priors) with evolving vi-
sual information during anticipation (see Cañal-Bruland & Mann, 2015;
Williams & Jackson, 2018). It has been proposed that athletes may
employ Bayesian reliability-based strategies to weigh up, and integrate,
contextual priors with relevant visual information: the reliance on
contextual priors and visual information is modulated by the com-
parative reliability of the information at hand, where more reliance is
assigned to information of relatively higher certainty with regard to the
to-be-anticipated event (Gredin, Bishop, Broadbent, Tucker, &
Williams, 2018). However, when examining anticipation in sport, a key,
but often overlooked, component of the Bayesian framework is the
comparative utility associated with possible judgements. Judgement
utility refers to the potential costs and rewards associated with the
consequences of one’s predictions: high judgement utility is associated
with high rewards (if accurate) and low costs (if inaccurate), and vice
versa for low judgement utility. According to Bayesian theory, people
attempt to maximise the probability of their judgements being accurate
while simultaneously maximise the expected utility of their judgments
(Geisler & Diehl, 2003). In the current study, we examined the impact
of judgement utility on the integration of explicit contextual priors and
visual information during anticipation in soccer.
It is well-established that expert athletes use advance visual in-
formation, such as opponent kinematics, to predict an opponent’s next
move (e.g., Farrow, Abernethy, & Jackson, 2005; Loffing & Hagemann,
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2014; Wright, Bishop, Jackson, & Abernethy, 2013). However, in recent
years, researchers have taken a broader focus when examining the
nature of anticipation in sport, by exploring the importance of non-
visual information, such as contextual priors (Broadbent, Gredin, Rye,
Williams, & Bishop, 2018; Gray & Cañal-Bruland, 2018; Gredin et al.,
2018; Navia, Van der Kamp, & Ruiz, 2013; Runswick et al., 2018a). Due
to advances in technology that enable sophisticated analyses of oppo-
nents, an increasingly prevalent component of elite sport preparation is
to provide athletes with contextual priors pertaining to the behaviours
of forthcoming opponents (Memmert, Lemmink, & Sampaio, 2017).
Gredin et al. (2018) recorded gaze patterns and anticipatory judge-
ments while soccer players predicted an opponent’s imminent actions
with the ball in 2-versus-2 defensive soccer scenarios. The players
performed the task both with and without explicitly provided con-
textual priors pertaining to the action tendencies of the attacker on the
ball – specifically, whether he tended to dribble or pass the ball to a
teammate. When given priors, the players allocated their visual atten-
tion toward the attacking teammate off the ball over the first half of
each trial, as their determination of the teammate’s run trajectory en-
abled them to inform their judgements according to the action ten-
dencies of the attacker on the ball. Over the second half of each trial,
closer to the key point of action, the players relied more on evolving
kinematic information of the attacker on the ball to inform their jud-
gements. The provision of explicit priors biased the players’ judgements
toward the most likely action, given the action tendencies, which re-
sulted in enhanced task performance (see also Broadbent et al., 2018;
Navia et al., 2013). Similarly, the beneficial performance effect of
contextual priors was reported by Runswick et al. (2018a) using a task
that required cricket batters to predict the location of forthcoming
deliveries from bowlers. The batters exhibited superior anticipation
when facing the same bowler six times in a row and when explicitly
provided with information about the game state and field setting,
compared to under conditions in which they faced six different bowlers
and were not explicitly presented information about the game state and
field setting. In the former condition, retrospective verbal reports de-
monstrated that the batters relied more on contextual priors to inform
their judgements when compared to the latter condition.
In the quest to develop an overarching framework that might ex-
plain the processes by which athletes combine contextual priors and
visual information during anticipation, Loffing and Cañal-Bruland
(2017) suggested that Bayesian theory may provide a suitable frame-
work to elucidate these processes. Bayesian models for probabilistic
inference assume that people base their judgements on probabilistic if-
then relationships between known informational variables and un-
known to-be-anticipated variables. That is, if ‘X’ (a known informa-
tional variable) occurs, then there is a certain probability that ‘Y’ (an
unknown to-be-anticipated variable) will occur. This process suggests
that, if one informational variable is associated with greater reliability
(i.e., higher certainty) than another, then the individual’s joint estimate
should be biased toward the ‘more reliable’ informational variable
(Knill & Pouget, 2004). In line with the suggestion by Loffing and
Cañal-Bruland (2017), Gredin et al. (2018) evaluated their findings
using a Bayesian framework for probabilistic inference. In keeping with
Bayesian theory, the authors proposed that players integrated explicit
contextual priors and evolving visual information according to the
comparative levels of reliability associated with the different sources of
information (see Vilares & Körding, 2011). That is, the players were
more dependent on priors over the first half of each trial where the
reliability of kinematic information was low, and vice versa (see also
Gray & Cañal-Bruland, 2018).
A fundamental aspect of Bayesian theory is that our ultimate jud-
gements are affected by both the reliability of available information and
the potential costs and rewards associated with inaccurate and accurate
judgements. Put in Bayesian terms, the weighted average of the relia-
bility conveyed by prior and current sources of information is con-
volved with the utility values assigned to possible judgements (Geisler
& Diehl, 2003). The biasing effect of judgement utility reflects not only
to our desire to gain rewards and avoid costs, but also our tendency to
use current information to confirm the viability of the high-utility op-
tion. As such, we tend to overestimate the likelihood of the outcome in
accordance with its utility (see DeKay, Patiño-Echeverri, & Fischbeck,
2009; Russo & Yong, 2011). The biasing effect of judgement utility was,
for example, shown in a study by Wallsten (1981) in which physicians
judged it to be more likely that a patient had a malignant tumour than a
cyst, despite the higher objective likelihood that the patient had a cyst.
It was proposed that physicians overestimated the chances of a tumour
due to its more severe consequences, relative to a cyst. In other words, a
tumour diagnosis would yield greater rewards (if correct) and lower
costs (if incorrect) than would diagnosing a cyst. In line with this
finding, Canãl-Bruland, Filius, and Oudejans (2015) reported that
skilled baseball batters tended to predict that fastballs would be pitched
to a greater extent than change-ups. It was suggested that this strategy
enabled them to handle the high speed of a fastball and, due to the
slower nature of change-ups, to adapt their swing if confronted with
this latter pitch type. If expecting a change-up, on the other hand,
batters would not be able to catch up with the speed of a fastball. This
finding suggests that judgement utility (e.g., comparatively higher
utility of predicting a fastball than a change-up in baseball) may in-
fluence anticipation in sport. However, the manner in which judgement
utility modulates the impact of contextual priors and processing prio-
rities during anticipation has yet to be examined empirically. Greater
awareness of the effects of judgement utility on athletes’ use of con-
textual priors will strengthen our understanding of action anticipation
processes in sport – which will ultimately enhance coaches’ and per-
formance analysts’ ability to maximise the effectiveness of explicit
contextual priors (see Cañal-Bruland & Mann, 2015).
In the current study, we examined the impact of judgement utility
on the integration of explicit contextual priors and visual information as
expert soccer players anticipated an oncoming opponent’s imminent
actions. We employed the same task as used by Gredin et al. (2018): a
video-based anticipation task simulating 2-versus-2 defensive soccer
scenarios, in which the players had to predict the direction (left or
right) of the attacker on the ball’s (termed ‘the opponent’ from hereon)
action at the end of each sequence. In addition to conditions with and
without explicitly provided contextual priors pertaining to the oppo-
nent’s action tendencies (dribble= 70%; pass= 30%), an additional
condition was added, in which contextual priors were explicitly pro-
vided and judgement utility was explicitly manipulated. Judgement
utility was manipulated by telling the players that an incorrect ‘right’
response would result in conceding a goal, which created imbalanced
judgement utility (left= high utility; right= low utility). We recorded
anticipation judgements and collected retrospective verbal reports of
the thoughts the players engaged in when solving the task.
We predicted that the explicit provision of contextual priors would
bias anticipatory judgements toward the most likely action given the
opponent’s action tendencies (i.e., dribble) and consequently enhance
their anticipation performance (Broadbent et al., 2018; Gredin et al.,
2018). Furthermore, we predicted that the explicit provision of con-
textual priors would result in players engaging in more thoughts related
to the positioning of the attacker off the ball (see the Method section for
detailed explanation) and the opponent’s action tendencies, whereas
fewer thoughts would be related to the opponent’s kinematics (cf.,
Runswick et al., 2018a). However, in keeping with Bayesian theory (see
Geisler & Diehl, 2003), we predicted that these effects would be su-
pressed when the priors were accompanied with manipulated judge-
ment utility, as players would be more inclined to opt for the direction
associated with the higher utility value (i.e., left). In the condition
where judgement utility was manipulated, it was hypothesised that the
players would engage in more thoughts related to the costs and/or re-
wards that their responses could bring about. Based on Bayesian the-
ories of weighted integration of information, we predicted that this
would result in fewer thoughts related to the opponent’s action
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tendencies and relevant visual information.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
A total of 18 (10 male and 8 female) expert soccer players
(Mage= 23 years, SD=3) participated. On average, the players had 14
years (SD=2) of competitive experience in soccer at university or
semi-professional level. At the time of the study, they participated in an
average of 9 h (SD=4) of soccer practice or match play per week. A
spreadsheet for estimating sample size for magnitude-based inferences
(Hopkins, 2006) was used to calculate the number of participants
needed to find a clear performance effects (i.e., chances of the true
effect to be substantially positive and negative < 5%; Batterham &
Hopkins, 2006; see the Data Analysis section for further details). We
used data from the study by Gredin et al. (2018) to calculate the
minimum required sample size (n=12; Hopkins, Marshall, Batterham,
& Hanin, 2009). The study was approved by the Research Ethics
Committee of the lead institution and conformed to the recommenda-
tions of the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave their written
informed consent before taking part.
2.2. Test stimuli
The test stimuli comprised 30 video sequences of 2-versus-2 counter
attacking scenarios in soccer, viewed from the perspective of one of the
defenders. The test stimuli were filmed on an artificial turf soccer pitch
using a high-definition digital video camera (Canon XF100, Tokyo,
Japan) with a wide-angle converter lens (Canon WD-H72 0.8x, Tokyo,
Japan). The camera was attached to a moving trolley, at a height of
1.7 m, to replicate the perspective of a central defender moving back-
wards. The final test footage was edited using Pinnacle Studio software
(v15; Pinnacle, Ottawa, Canada). In total, 130 video simulations were
created, but only clips that were independently selected by two quali-
fied soccer coaches (UEFA A Licence holders), based on their re-
presentativeness of actual game play, were included in the final test
footage of 30 clips.
In each sequence, there was one attacking player in possession of
the ball (‘the opponent’), a second attacker off the ball, and one
marking defender who was following the second attacker throughout
the sequence (see Figure 1). The videos were projected onto a
3.3×1.9m projection screen using an Optoma HD20 DLP projector
(Optoma, New Taipei City, Taiwan). The participant viewed the sce-
narios from a first-person perspective, as if they were the second de-
fender. At the start of the sequence, the opponent was positioned ap-
proximately 7m in front of the participant, 10m to the right of the
centre of the pitch, and 3m inside the defensive half. The attacker off
the ball and the second defender started approximately 3m behind,
either on the left, or the right, side of the opponent. When the sequence
started to unfold, the players approached the participant and, after
approximately 1.5 s, the attacker off the ball made a direction change
towards either the left or the right. The sequences lasted for 5 s and, at
the end of each sequence, the opponent could either pass the ball to his
teammate who was positioned either to the left or right of the opponent
(30% of trials) or dribble the ball in the opposite direction of the
teammate (70% of trials).
2.3. Task design
The participant was required to predict the direction (left or right)
of the ball from the opponent’s final action. At the start of each trial, the
participant was standing 3.5m in front of the projection screen holding
a response device in each hand − one for ‘left’ responses and one for
‘right’ responses. The participant was instructed that they should re-
spond as soon as they were certain enough to carry out an action based
on their prediction and that they could not change this response.
Immediately after the participant’s response, the trial was occluded and
feedback with regard to their response time and accuracy was displayed
on-screen. Feedback for response time and accuracy was given as pilot
testing suggested that receiving this information after each trial moti-
vated the participant to stay engaged with the test task throughout the
test session. A full 5-s trial was occluded 120m s after the foot-ball
contact of the opponent’s final action and if the participant responded
after this point, then that trial was counted as incorrect. Since players in
a soccer match are normally aware of the position of the ball and other
players each trial started with a frozen frame for 1 s to allow the par-
ticipant to detect this information. During the course of a trial, the
participant was free to move as preferred in order to maximise the real-
world representativeness of the task (cf. Gredin et al., 2018).
2.4. Procedure
Before testing, the participant undertook 25–40min of training in
how to provide retrospective think-aloud reports. This training con-
sisted of instructions on how to report thoughts retrospectively, in-
cluding practice on a number of generic tasks. The participant was
given feedback on their verbal reports, along with good and bad ex-
amples for these practice tasks (see Eccles, 2012). Throughout the
training, the participant was encouraged to ask the researcher questions
if they were unsure about how to articulate their reports. The aim of the
verbal report training was to ensure that the participant learned how to
verbalise only the thoughts that they used during the preceding task
performance and to report them as they were naturally experienced
during performance. This procedure is important to follow, as elabor-
ating or providing commentary on the reported thoughts, or reporting
thoughts that were not used during task performance may influence
performance and violate the natural cognitive processes that occur
during the task (Ericsson & Simon, 1980). Following this training, the
participant was fitted with a lapel microphone and a body-pack trans-
mitter that was wirelessly connected to a compact diversity receiver
(ew112-p G3; Sennheiser, Wedemark, Germany) and a recording device
(Zoom H5; Zoom Corporation, Tokyo, Japan), so that verbal reports
could be recorded. Thereafter, the participant was given an overview of
the experimental protocol and performed eight familiarisation trials to
become accustomed to the experimental setup and response require-
ments. Verbal reports of thoughts were collected after four of the fa-
miliarisation trials.
Following the familiarisation trials, the 30 test trials were presented
in three blocks of ten trials, and under three different conditions (i.e.,
90 test trials in total). In the control condition (Control), the participant
performed the task without any additional information. In one of the
experimental conditions (EXP), the participant performed the same
task, but before each block, the participant was explicitly primed
(verbally and on-screen) with contextual priors pertaining to the op-
ponent’s action tendencies (i.e., dribble= 70%; pass= 30%). Due to
the nature of the task, the positioning of the attacker off the ball re-
vealed information that enabled the participant to use information
about the opponent’s action tendencies (i.e., if the attacker off the ball
was on the left, 70% of the opponent’s final actions were to the right,
and vice versa). This meant that the participant had to incorporate the
explicit contextual priors (i.e., the opponent’s action tendencies) with
evolving visual information (i.e., the positioning of the attacker off the
ball) in order to use the priors to inform their judgement. In complex
and highly dynamic performance environments, such as in soccer, this
interdependency between contextual priors and visual information may
be an important component when seeking to elucidate the integration
of different sources of information during anticipation (Gredin et al.,
2018).
In the other experimental condition (EXPJU), the same task was
performed, and the same contextual priors were explicitly provided, but
in this condition, the participant was instructed that if they were
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incorrect (i.e., responded ‘right’) when the opponent passed or dribbled
the ball toward the left, their team would concede a goal. This in-
struction was given in order to increase the comparative utility asso-
ciated with responding ‘left’. In other words, correct and incorrect ‘left’
responses came with greater rewards (stopping a goal) and costs
(conceding a goal), respectively, than ‘right’ responses. This manip-
ulation was based on the fact that in soccer, possession of the ball in a
more central position near the penalty area (i.e., to the participant’s left
in the present task) is more frequently associated with positive at-
tacking outcomes than possession in a wider position (i.e., to the par-
ticipant’s right; Brooks, Kerr, & Guttag, 2016). The participant received
this instruction before each block, both verbally and on-screen, and was
informed as to the number of goals they had conceded after each block.
Each condition started with a condition-specific familiarisation trial,
for which retrospective verbal reports were collected. To eliminate the
influence of trial-specific characteristics, the same test trials were used
in all three conditions. Thus, the distribution of trials where the op-
ponent dribbled (70%) and passed (30%) the ball was identical across
all three conditions. Furthermore, these actions were equally dis-
tributed across left and right outcome directions. The order in which
the conditions were presented was randomised and counterbalanced
across participants, which is a commonly used design in order to mi-
tigate potential learning and carryover effects across various experi-
mental conditions in sport (e.g., Gray, 2009; Jackson, Ashford, &
Norsworthy, 2006; Runswick, Roca, Williams, Bezodis, & North, 2017).
To further avoid any potential familiarity between conditions, the trial
order in each condition was randomised (cf. Gredin et al., 2018). Re-
sponse time and accuracy were recorded for each trial and verbal re-
ports of thoughts were collected after six trials in each condition (cf.
Runswick et al., 2018a). The selection of trials for which verbal reports
were given was pseudorandomised in order to counterbalance the
number of trials where the opponent dribbled (n=3) and passed
(n=3) the ball, as well as the number of trials where the direction of
the final actions was left (n=3) and right (n=3). The same trials were
selected for all conditions and participants in order to avoid trial-spe-
cific characteristics from violating the verbal report data. The whole
test session was completed within 90min.
2.5. Dependent measures
Anticipatory judgements. To ascertain whether any systematic
speed–accuracy trade-off effects were evident in the response data,
Pearson correlations between response time and accuracy were de-
termined for each condition. A positive correlation between the two
variables was found in each of the three conditions (Control,
r=0.59 ± 0.28 [90% CI]; EXP, r= .66 ± 0.24; EXPJU,
r=0.68)± 0.23). To account for this speed-accuracy trade off, an-
ticipation performance was expressed as an anticipation efficiency score,
which was calculated by multiplying the average response time by the
proportion of inaccurate responses in each condition (note: lower effi-
ciency score indicates superior anticipation performance; cf. Gredin
et al., 2018). In addition to the anticipation efficiency score, anticipa-
tion performance was expressed by the change in response accuracy
between each condition, where the change in response time was used as
a covariate in order to account for the covariation in the speed and
accuracy measures (cf. Abernethy, Schorer, Jackson, & Hagemann,
2012). As we predicted that explicit contextual priors would bias the
players’ judgements toward the most likely action, given the opponent’s
Figure 1. Test Stimuli. The two different positions that the attacker off the ball and the defender could have at the start of each sequence: to the left (a) or the right
(b) side of the opponent. The four different actions that the opponent could carry out at the end of each sequence: pass left (c), pass right (d), dribble left (e), and
dribble right (f).
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action tendencies, we calculated the proportion of ‘dribble’ responses in
each condition (note: a ‘dribble’ response corresponded to when the
participant responded ‘right’ and the attacker off the ball was on the left
side of the opponent or when the participant responded ‘left’ and the
attacker off the ball was on the right side of the opponent). As we
predicted that judgement utility would bias the players’ judgement
toward the direction with the comparatively higher utility, the pro-
portion of ‘left’ responses in each condition was assessed.
Verbal reports. The verbal reports of thoughts were first tran-
scribed verbatim, and the statements conveyed by each report were
then coded into different categories (cf. Murphy et al., 2016; Roca,
Ford, McRobert, & Williams, 2013; Runswick et al., 2018a). Statements
were coded into three categories of visual information: positioning of the
attacker off the ball, statements referring to the horizontal position (e.g.,
left, right, inside, outside) of the attacker off the ball relative to op-
ponent; kinematic information, statements referring to the kinematic
cues of the oncoming opponent; other visual information, statements
referring to other kind of visual information not captured by the pre-
vious two categories. Furthermore, statements were coded into two
categories of non-visual information: action tendencies, statements re-
ferring to the opponent’s tendency to pass or dribble the ball; judgement
utility, statements referring to the costs and/or rewards their responses
could bring about. Verbal report data from 3 participants, and 9 reports
(< 4%) from the remaining 15 participants, were excluded from the
analyses due to participants failing to follow the procedure required for
providing retrospective think-aloud reports (see Eccles, 2012). Once
statements within each eligible report had been categorised, the pro-
portion of reports in each condition that contained statements of each
category was assessed (note: each report could contain references to
multiple sources of information; cf. Murphy et al., 2016).
2.6. Statistical analysis
Descriptive statistics are reported as means and SDs. Magnitudes of
observed effects along with their 90% CIs are reported as standardised
(d) and unstandardised units. The effects were standardised by dividing
the mean difference between conditions by the combined SD and then
interpreted against the following scale: 0.2> |d|, trivial; 0.2 ≤
|d|< 0.5, small; 0.5 ≤ |d|< 0.8, moderate; 0.8 < |d|, large (Cohen,
1988; Cumming, 2012). Cohen’s standardised unit for the smallest
substantial effect (0.2) was used as a threshold value when estimating
the uncertainty in true effects. The following scale was used to convert
the quantitative chances to qualitative descriptors: 25–75%, possible;
75–95%, likely; 95–99.5%, very likely;> 99.5%, most likely (Hopkins,
2002). If the lower and upper bounds of the CI exceeded the thresholds
for the smallest substantial negative and positive effect, respectively,
meaning that there is≥ 5% that the true effect could be substantially
negative and ≥5% that it could be substantially positive, then the effect
was deemed unclear. All other effects were deemed clear and evaluated
as per the description above (Batterham & Hopkins, 2006). The con-
fidence level of the CIs was not adjusted for multiple comparisons
(Hopkins, Marchall, Batterham, & Hanin, 2009; Perneger, 1998;
Rothman, 1990). Due to the low number of participants making refer-
ences to the sources of non-visual information in their verbal reports,
leading to high variability across participants and skewed data, in-
ferential analyses were not conducted on the verbal reports of action
tendencies and judgement utility. For these reports, descriptive statis-




Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the response time and
accuracy scores in each condition1,2. As shown in Figure 2a, the par-
ticipants exhibited superior performance, manifested in a lower an-
ticipation efficiency score, in EXP than in Control (d=0.54 ± 0.35)
and EXPJU (d=0.43 ± 0.35), whereas no substantial effect was ob-
tained when the anticipation efficiency score in Control was compared
to that in EXPJU (d=0.14 ± 0.34). The analysis of the adjusted effects
for response accuracy between conditions revealed that response ac-
curacy was higher in EXP than in Control (d=0.35 ± 0.29) and EXPJU
(d=0.25 ± 0.30), whereas no substantial effect was found between
Control and EXPJU (d=0.12 ± 0.27; note: changes in response time
were included as a covariate in these analyses). The proportion of trials
in which the participants predicted that the opponent would dribble
was higher in EXP than in Control (d=0.66 ± 0.47) and EXPJU
(d=0.89 ± 0.46), whereas no clear effect was found when the pro-
portion of ‘dribble’ responses in Control was compared to that in EXPJU
(see Figure 2a). Figure 2c shows that the proportion of trials where the
participants predicted that the opponent would dribble or pass the ball
toward the left was higher in Control than in EXP (d=0.33 ± 0.42)
and higher in EXPJU, both compared to Control (d=0.65 ± 0.44) and
compared to EXP (d=1.03 ± 0.47). Unstandardised effects for an-
ticipation efficiency, percentage ‘dribble’ responses, and percentage
‘left’ responses across conditions are presented in Table 2.
3.2. Verbal reports
The percentage of verbal reports referring to each category of visual
information in each condition is presented in Figure 3. The participants
reported a higher proportion of statements referring to the positioning
of the attacker off the ball in EXP than in Control (d=0.37 ± 0.34)
and EXPJU (d=0.22 ± 0.39), whereas no substantial difference was
found between Control and EXPJU (d=0.12 ± 0.28). The percentage
of statements referring to the kinematic information of the opponent
was higher in Control than in EXP (d=0.59 ± 0.27) and EXPJU
(d=1.03 ± 0.43), and higher in EXP than in EXPJU
(d=0.47 ± 0.27). Regarding other sources of visual information, the
participants reported a higher proportion of statements within this ca-
tegory in Control than in EXP (d=0.32 ± 0.37) and EXPJU
(d=0.40 ± 0.27), while no clear difference was obtained between
EXP and EXPJU. Unstandardised effects for the percentage of verbal
reports referring to each category of visual information across condi-
tions are presented in Table 3. In reports containing statements refer-
ring to non-visual information, the proportion containing statements
relating to the opponent’s action tendencies were 1.1% (SD=4.3) in
Control, 32.2% (SD=28.5) in EXP, and 22.2% (SD=29.5) in EXPJU.
Only one participant mentioned this information source in Control,
whereas eleven and nine participants referred to the opponent’s action
tendencies in EXP and EXPJU, respectively. Statements relating to jud-
gement utility were reported in 34.2% (SD=32.5) of the reports in
EXPJU, while the corresponding proportions in Control and EXP were
14.2% (SD=23.3) and 3.3% (SD=12.9), respectively. Statements
referring to this category was reported by five participants in Control,
Table 1
Descriptive statistics (M ± SD) for the response time (ms) and accuracy (%) in
each condition.
Control EXP EXPJU
Response time 4416±518 4316±756 4405±453
Response accuracy 63±13 67±10 65±11
1 Independent effects for response time: EXP vs. Control, d=0.15 ± 0.29;
EXPJU vs. Control, d=0.02 ± 0.29; EXPJU vs. EXP, d=0.14 ± 0.31
2 Independent effects for response accuracy: EXP vs. Control,
d=0.35 ± 0.31; EXPJU vs. Control, d=0.12 ± 0.36; EXPJU vs. EXP,
d=0.25 ± 0.31
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Figure 2. Anticipation Efficiency Score (a), Percentage ‘Dribble’ Responses (b), and Percentage ‘Left’ Responses (c). Means and SDs in each condition, as well as
inferences of observed and true effects between conditions.
Note: Lower anticipation efficiency score indicates superior performance. Inference of observed effect: 0.2 >
|d|, trivial (T); 0.2≤ |d| < 0.5, small (S); 0.5≤ |d| < 0.8, moderate (M); 0.8 < |d|, large (L). Inference of uncertainty in true effect: * possibly (25–75%); ** likely
(75–95%); *** very likely (95–99.5%); **** most likely (> 99.5%).
Table 2
Unstandardised effects (M±90% CI) for the anticipatory judgement data across conditions.
EXP vs. Control EXPJU vs. Control EXPJU vs. EXP
Anticipation efficiency score −231.6± 152.1 −63.6± 149.9 166.9±136.7
Percentage ‘dribble’ responses 7.9± 5.7 −1.6±6.0 −9.6±4.9
Percentage ‘left’ responses −3.4±4.3 8.2± 5.5 11.6± 5.3
Note: Lower anticipation efficiency score indicates superior performance.
Figure 3. Percentage Verbal Reports. Means and SDs for the percentage of verbal reports referring to each category of visual information in each condition, as well as
inferences of observed and true effects between conditions.
Note: AoB=
attacker off the ball. Inference of observed effect: 0.2 >
|d|, trivial (T); 0.2≤ |d| < 0.5, small (S); 0.5≤ |d| < 0.8, moderate (M); 0.8 < |d|, large (L). Inference of uncertainty in true effect: * possibly (25–75%); ** likely
(75–95%); *** very likely (95–99.5%); **** most likely (> 99.5%).
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one participant in EXP, and twelve participants in EXPJU.
4. Discussion
We examined the impact of judgement utility on the integration of
explicit contextual priors and visual information as expert soccer
players predicted the direction (left or right) of an oncoming opponent’s
imminent actions. The players performed the anticipation task under
three different conditions: one condition without any explicit con-
textual priors; another condition in which contextual priors pertaining
to the opponent’s action tendencies (dribble= 70%; pass= 30%) were
explicitly provided; and a third condition in which these contextual
priors were explicitly provided, and judgement utility was explicitly
manipulated (left judgements= high utility; right judgements= low
utility). We recorded anticipatory judgements and collected retro-
spective think-aloud reports in all three conditions.
In line with our predictions, the explicit provision of contextual
priors biased the players’ anticipatory judgements toward the most
likely action, given the opponent’s action tendencies. This effect was
manifested in the fact that the players predicted the opponent would
dribble the ball to a greater extent in the condition with explicit con-
textual priors, compared to the condition in which no priors were
provided. This finding supports previous research suggesting that ex-
pert soccer players use explicit contextual priors to inform their jud-
gements when predicting an oncoming opponent’s next move
(Broadbent et al., 2018; Gredin et al., 2018). As we predicted, this
biasing effect of explicit contextual priors resulted in enhanced per-
formance, which was evidenced by superior anticipation efficiency in
the condition with, compared to without, explicit priors. These findings
support the growing body of research demonstrating the performance-
enhancing effect of contextual priors on anticipation in sport
(Broadbent et al., 2018; Gredin et al., 2018; Navia et al., 2013;
Runswick et al., 2018a).
An important objective of this study was to examine the impact of
judgement utility on the players’ anticipation. As we hypothesised,
judgement utility supressed the impact of explicit contextual priors: the
proportion of ‘dribble’ responses did not increase when priors were
accompanied by the judgement utility manipulation. In line with our
predictions, this resulted in anticipation performance comparable to
that in the control condition. As prescribed by Bayesian models for
informational integration, this finding suggests that expert soccer
players base their judgements both on the reliability of the information
at hand and the costs and rewards their responses could generate (see
Geisler & Diehl, 2003). In other words, it appears that judgement utility
reduced the impact of contextual priors, as the players were more in-
clined to opt for the direction with the comparatively higher utility.
Further support for the impact of judgement utility on anticipatory
judgements is apparent in the comparison made between the proportion
of ‘left’ responses across conditions. As predicted, the proportion of
responses where the players opted for a leftward outcome was higher in
the condition where judgement utility was manipulated, compared to
the other two conditions. Such a biasing effect of judgement utility has
been demonstrated across various domains (see Canãl-Bruland et al.,
2015; DeKay et al., 2009; Russo & Yong, 2011). It is noteworthy
though, that the players responded ‘left’ more often than ‘right’ in all
three conditions. It may be the case that the players associated the left
side with greater goal threat, due to the position on the pitch (Brooks
et al., 2016) even though this information was not explicitly provided,
and hence there were more ‘left’ responses in all three conditions. This
suggestion aligns with the findings reported by Canãl-Bruland et al.
(2015) demonstrating that baseball batters predicted fastballs to a
greater extent than change-ups, even if they were not explicitly in-
structed that predicting fastballs came with greater utility. Interest-
ingly, in the two conditions without manipulated judgement utility, the
players were more inclined to respond ‘left’ in the condition without
explicit contextual priors. In keeping with Bayesian theory (see Geisler
& Diehl, 2003; Vilares & Körding, 2011), the perceived imbalance in
threat between left and right outcomes may have been weighted higher
in the former condition where less reliance was placed on the oppo-
nent’s action tendencies.
To explore the processing priorities employed by the players during
task performance, we collected immediate retrospective verbal reports
of their thought processes. The data provide tentative support for our
prediction that the players would refer to the opponent’s action ten-
dencies to a greater extent when this information was explicitly pro-
vided, relative to when it was not. Furthermore, when contextual priors
were explicitly provided, the players reported a higher proportion of
thoughts relating to the attacker off the ball, compared to the latter
condition. This finding aligns with the gaze data in Gredin and col-
leagues' (2018) study, in which expert soccer players shifted their overt
visual attention away from the opponent, and toward the attacker off
the ball, when explicit contextual priors were provided. In the case of
that study, and the current one, it is proposed that the players priori-
tised the positioning of the attacker off the ball more so when con-
textual priors were explicitly provided compared to when they were
not. This information enabled the players to inform their anticipatory
judgements in accordance with the opponent’s action tendencies (i.e.,
when the attacker off the ball was on the left, 70% of the opponent’s
final actions were to the right, and vice versa).
The verbal report data in the current study also showed that the
proportion of thoughts relating to the opponent’s kinematic information
was lower in the condition in which contextual priors were explicitly
provided, relative to in the condition where they were not. This finding
mirrors that of Runswick et al. (2018a), who demonstrated that an
increased reliance on contextual priors came with a decreased reliance
on kinematic information, when cricket batters predicted the location
of forthcoming deliveries from a bowler. The previous research, and the
current study, provide support for the Bayesian notion that, when the
reliability of one informational variable increases (e.g., increased re-
liability of contextual priors via explicit guidance or sequential pickup),
people’s judgements become less contingent upon other informational
variables (e.g., kinematic information; see Vilares & Körding, 2011).
In the condition where judgement utility was manipulated, the
players engaged less in thoughts relating to the positioning of the at-
tacker off the ball and fewer players referred to the opponent’s action
tendencies, compared to when explicit contextual priors were provided,
but judgement utility was not manipulated. Furthermore, in the former
condition, the players engaged less in thoughts relating to the oppo-
nent’s kinematic information, and more players referred to the costs
and/or rewards their responses could bring about, relative to in the
other two conditions. In line with our predictions, these data provide
tentative support that the biasing effect of judgement utility on an-
ticipation was underpinned by changes in the thought processes that
the players employed during task performance; namely, an increased
concern about the costs and/or rewards their responses could bring
about (see also DeKay et al., 2009; Russo & Yong, 2011).
The current study lends support to the idea that Bayesian theory
may provide a suitable framework to elucidate the processes by which
athletes inform their judgments during action anticipation (Loffing &
Cañal-Bruland, 2017). However, it is important to note that the ex-
perimental design in this study did not allow us to test the predictions
Table 3
Unstandardised effects (M±90% CI) for the percentage verbal reports of visual
information across conditions.
EXP vs. Control EXPJU vs. Control EXPJU vs. EXP
Positioning of AoB 14.2± 13.2 5.1± 11.5 −9.1±16.2
Kinematic information −21.0± 9.6 −37.8± 15.7 −16.8± 9.5
Other −12.7± 14.5 −15.1± 10.3 −2.4±11.5
Note: AoB=attacker off the ball.
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prescribed by Bayesian theory in relation to the impact of contextual
priors, visual information and judgement utility in a fine-grained
quantitative manner. Thus, we encourage researchers to further explore
the merits of Bayesian theory in this regard; for example, by adopting
temporal occlusion paradigms to more tightly control the availability of
visual information (e.g., Runswick, Roca, Williams, McRobert, & North,
2018b), by altering the reliability of priors in a more fine-grained
manner (e.g., Gray & Cañal-Bruland, 2018), and/or by using continuous
outcome possibilities, rather than a binary-choice task (e.g., Tassinari,
Hudson, & Landy, 2006).
Our findings may prove highly informative to coaches and perfor-
mance analysts, who typically use contextual priors to guide their
players’ on-pitch decision making. In situations where inaccurate and
accurate judgements incur varying costs and rewards, it seems like
judgement utility disrupts players’ processing priorities and decreases
the effectiveness of explicit contextual priors. However, it is worth
noting that soccer matches are inherently complex, comprising multiple
crossmodal sources of environmental information, priors that relate to
multiple players and/or situations, and a multitude of potential out-
comes. Thus, it is possible that the task in the current study did not
evoke behaviours that we might observe under natural performance
conditions (see Cañal-Bruland, Müller, Lach, & Spence, 2018; Müller &
Abernethy, 2012; Vaeyens, Lenoir, Williams, Mazyn, & Philippaerts,
2007). Clearly, the impact of judgement utility should be further ex-
plored, using more naturalistic test tasks.
Another potential limitation of this study was that we did not in-
clude a condition in which we manipulated judgement utility and
provided no explicit contextual priors. Adding such a condition would
allow us to assess the moderating effects of judgement utility with
greater certainty. However, pilot work suggested that the effects that
would have been obtained in such a condition would not have been
substantially different to those obtained in the EXPJU.
Also, it is worth highlighting that it is possible that the players in the
current study used information acquired in preceding conditions to
inform their task performance in subsequent conditions. Thus, in order
to mitigate potential confounding order effects, we employed a ran-
domised and counterbalanced within-participant design, which is a
well-established approach when comparing the effects of various in-
formational conditions in sport (cf. Gray, 2009; Jackson et al., 2006;
Runswick et al., 2017). To further avoid any potential familiarity effects
across conditions, the trial order in each condition was randomised (cf.
Gredin et al., 2018). Furthermore, it is possible that the feedback for
response time and accuracy provided after each trial created another
source of information that could have facilitated trial-to-trial learning.
However, self-reported pilot data suggest that, without this immediate
feedback about their performance, the players’ motivation to engage
with the task would decline over the course of testing. In the study by
Gredin et al. (2018), in which the players performed a similar task and
received feedback for response time and accuracy after each trial, the
authors did not find any substantial performance effect when the initial
24 trials of a conditions were compared to the final 24 trials of that
condition. This finding suggests that task experience, including feed-
back on performance after each trial, did not change the players’ per-
formance on the task. A related issue is the potential risk that the ret-
rospective verbal reports of thoughts may have disrupted the natural
thought processes in which the players engaged during task perfor-
mance and, as such, influenced their behaviours on the task. In order to
mitigate this risk, the players undertook 25–40min of training on how
to only report heeded thoughts in a way that they were naturally ex-
perienced during the task, rather than trying to explain, justify, or
qualify their thoughts or behaviours during the task (see Eccles, 2012;
Ericsson & Simon, 1980).
In summary, our findings suggest that the explicit provision of
contextual priors biased expert soccer players’ processing priorities
during action anticipation: greater reliance was placed on the priors
and context-relevant visual information, while less reliance was placed
on evolving kinematic information. This, in turn, biased anticipatory
judgements toward the most likely outcome, given the contextual
priors, and enhanced anticipation performance. However, the biasing
impact of explicit contextual priors, in regard to both anticipation and
associated thought processes, was supressed when the comparative
utilities associated with potential judgements differed. Under these
conditions, the players became less reliant on the contextual priors and
unfolding visual information, and more inclined to opt for the outcome
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